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Summary 
 
Drawing on case studies from the telecommunications and auto industries, we argue that 
the vertical disintegration of major German employers is contributing to the 
disorganisation of Germany’s dual system of in-plant and sectoral negotiations. 1 
Subcontractors, subsidiaries, and temporary agencies often have no collective bargaining 
institutions, weaker firm-level agreements, or are covered by different sectoral 
agreements. As core employers move jobs to these firms, they introduce new 
organisational boundaries across the production chain and disrupt traditional bargaining 
structures. Worker representatives are developing new campaign approaches and using 
residual power at large firms to establish representation in new firms and sectors, but 
these have not been successful at re-building coordinated bargaining.
                                                 
1
 Field research for this paper was supported by the Fulbright Commission, the German Academic 
Exchange Service, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University’s 
Einaudi Center and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. Thanks to Marco Hauptmeier, 
Ursula Holtgrewe, Gregory Jackson, Christine Trampusch, and Lowell Turner for valuable comments.  An 
earlier version of this paper was presented at the Collective Bargaining Workshop at Cornell-ILR, the MIT-
Cornell Graduate Student Workshop, and the 2005 Society for the Advancement of Socio-economics 
conference. 
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The future of industrial relations in “social Europe” is increasingly uncertain, as 
European trade unions seek new strategies to slow declining membership and political 
influence. Corporate restructuring has played a central role in these changes. Collective 
bargaining in traditional union strongholds has shifted from the national or industry level 
to the establishment level (Katz and Darbishire 2000). Meanwhile, growing numbers of 
firms are leaving employers’ associations or setting up greenfield operations outside of 
collective agreements.  
 There is broad agreement that European industrial relations institutions are 
changing. However, there continues to be disagreement on the long term prospects of a 
European social model characterized by strong, inclusive unions and broad industrial 
citizenship rights. Germany has been at the centre of these debates, due to its tradition of 
strong, coordinated collective bargaining and a remarkably robust trade union movement 
(Turner 1991; Thelen 1991; Hall and Soskice 2001); and has more recently become a key 
test case for analyzing the stability or erosion of these institutions (Yamamura and 
Streeck 2003; Paterson and Green 2005).   
 A key question in this literature is how firm strategies to restructure production 
affect bargaining structures and trade union bargaining power. In this paper, we analyze 
the effects of one common but under-studied form of restructuring – vertical 
disintegration – on German industrial relations, drawing on case studies from the 
telecommunications and auto industries. Vertical disintegration is typically defined as the 
creation of new intermediate markets in a previously integrated production process 
(Jacobides 2005: 465). This can include subcontracting production to a separate firm, the 
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creation of independent subsidiaries, and use of temporary agencies for staffing. The 
common change we describe is one that moves production or services from vertically 
integrated hierarchies to networks characterized by more market-based relations between 
two or more organizations, typically dominated by a single powerful customer.  
 We argue that vertical disintegration creates substantial challenges for trade 
unions that make it increasingly difficult to maintain or rebuild the institutions that are 
the core of Germany’s “dual system” of collective bargaining. Vertical disintegration 
differs from other forms of organizational restructuring, such as decentralization of 
decision-making and mergers and acquisitions, because it sets up more competitive 
markets for investment within and across firms and introduces new sectoral boundaries 
across the production chain of large “core” firms. There are two main ways that this 
undermines coordinated bargaining. First, vertical disintegration allows managers to 
move jobs from a well-organized core to a more poorly organized periphery of firms that 
have no collective agreements or that are covered by firm-level agreements.  
Alternatively, it results in a shift of work to new sectoral agreements, typically negotiated 
by different unions. Under both scenarios, employers are able to segment their workforce 
in new ways, increasing variation in wages and working conditions and undermining 
coordinated bargaining.  
 In the following section, we review the literature on continuity and change in the 
German model of industrial relations. We show that most research to date has treated 
bargaining decentralisation within core firms and the growth of a peripheral 
“disorganised” sector as separate phenomena, without analysing the relationship between 
them. Second, we discuss recent developments in Germany that have contributed to the 
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growing popularity of outsourcing, and present national data from Germany that 
demonstrate increased vertical disintegration across sectors. In the third section, we 
present findings from case studies conducted between 2003 and 2004 in the 
telecommunications and auto industries. We conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our findings for comparative industrial relations theory and research. 
 
Change in German Industrial Relations 
The German system of industrial relations remained surprisingly stable 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when union density and influence were 
declining in most other industrialized countries. This stability was attributed to the unique 
characteristics of the “dual system” of interest representation, which combined 
coordinated sector-level wage bargaining with establishment and firm-level co-
determination. Despite the legally mandated separation between works councils and 
unions, in-plant and sectoral labour representatives worked closely together. Firms relied 
on employer associations for a wide range of services and paid workers according to 
sectoral agreements. The labour movement used leverage from this bottom-up/top-down 
coordination to win gains in well-organized industries and regions, such as the harbours 
or auto plants, and spread them to poorly organized places, like hospitals or electronics 
plants (Turner 1991; Thelen 1991).   
Even in their more contentious moments, German unions acted within this system 
– anchored both in law and customary practice – as social partners responsible both for 
industrial adjustment and for worker well-being. The widespread application of sectoral 
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collective agreements (between 70 percent and 80 percent of workers in metalworking 
industries) and stable union density (around 40 percent overall between 1970 and 1990) 
gave organized labour a great deal of influence over pay and working conditions. The 
German model delivered both equity and efficiency by putting socially desirable 
constraints on business that stimulated investment in skills, promoted social peace, and 
enhanced corporate performance (Streeck 1992). These outcomes in turn proved to be a 
stable source of competitive advantage for firms in export-oriented manufacturing 
industries (Hall and Soskice 2001). For many different reasons, these writers saw in 
Germany a society stabilized by strong industrial relations institutions. 
Over the 1990s, evidence began to accumulate that Germany’s industrial relations 
institutions were weakening. Surveys showed that concessionary plant-level bargaining in 
both eastern and western Germany, some of it illegal, was becoming common practice 
(Massa-Wirth and Seifert 2004). Sociologists documented cases where intensified global 
competition and growing unemployment were allowing a rollback of in-plant worker 
participation to their legal minima, even in large firms with a strong union presence 
(Springer 1999). The news media reported on highly visible union defeats in union 
strongholds, such as the lost metal industry strike of 2003 and concessionary agreements 
on pay and working time at DaimlerChrysler, Siemens, and VW.  
Meanwhile, the membership density of unions and employers associations and the 
coverage of collective bargaining steadily deteriorated (Hassel 1999). By 2003, union 
membership had fallen to around 8 million from the post-unification peak in 1991 of 14 
million (Schroeder and Wessels 2003). Local employer associations, in hopes of retaining 
members, established non-union affiliates to help companies cope with labour law and 
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human resource issues without binding them to a sectoral agreement (Schroeder and 
Silvia 2003). Alternative private service providers began offering works councils training 
and advisory services, often replacing unions in this role (Rossmann 2001).  
There is a growing literature on the changes under way in Germany’s coordinated 
model of industrial relations. Institutional scholars who long argued that the German 
model was a competitive alternative to liberal markets have begun to take seriously the 
effects of neoliberal policy, changing corporate organization, and the growth of 
shareholder value on industrial relations (Streeck and Thelen 2004; Katz and Darbishire 
2000; Paterson and Green 2005). At the same time, there continue to be different 
interpretations of the mechanisms through which change occurs and how these changes 
will in turn affect the stability of dual system bargaining institutions in Germany.  
One argument holds that employer interests in industrial peace lead them to 
support stability in bargaining arrangements, at least in core sectors and among large 
employers. Thelen and her colleagues (Thelen and Kume 1999; Thelen and Van 
Wijnbergen 2003) have argued that German employers are not interested in breaking the 
dual system apart. They point to positive strike settlements on the unions’ terms in the 
metalworking industry and continued commitment of employers’ associations to 
bargaining as evidence that sectoral agreements are still relatively stable and 
encompassing institutions. 
A second, and complementary, argument holds that Germany’s strong co-
determination institutions persist because of their ability to adapt to changing market 
conditions. Streeck (2001) has argued that co-determination continues to provide a great 
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deal of flexibility. Managers can outsource, sell their subsidiaries, downsize, merge and 
engage in a wide range of other activities without sparking conflict with worker 
representatives (Streeck 2001). Research on large German firms has found that unions 
and works councils have done little to oppose the introduction of shareholder value as the 
dominant goal of corporate governance (Höpner 2003) and much to allow flexibility 
through firm-level pacts (Rehder 2003). Thus, although formal institutions have remained 
stable, the German bargaining system has changed through new innovations by labour 
and management representatives (Hassel and Rehder 2001; Jackson 2005). 
Other writers have come to similar conclusions. Frege (2003) presents survey 
evidence that works councils in several sectors have maintained cooperative attitudes and 
sustained some balance of power with management despite deteriorating bargaining 
conditions. Behrens and Jacoby (2004) argue that unions and employers associations 
create “firewalls” that prevent new innovations in organizing strategies or work 
organization from undermining the overall “logic” of German industrial relations. These 
scholars agree that German institutions are changing, but in a gradual and path-dependent 
manner, which Streeck and Thelen (2004: 4) term “transformation without disruption.”  
 
Vertical disintegration and the disorganization of sectoral bargaining 
We argue here that vertical disintegration contributes to more disruptive changes 
in Germany’s industrial relations institutions.  Political economy scholars have long 
debated how changes in the organisation of production would affect workers and their 
representatives. One group of scholars argued that workers would gain bargaining power, 
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as new network-based production models required increased investments in skills and 
union participation in implementing new models of work design (Piore and Sabel 1984). 
Others warned that the growth of outsourcing would allow powerful buyers to push risks 
of fluctuating demand onto the workforce of supplier firms, which in turn would 
aggravate economic and social dualism (Harrison 1994).  Researchers who studied dual 
labour markets in the US and Japanese Keiretsu in the 1970s and 1980s similarly argued 
that subcontractors and small firms constituted a secondary sector that supported the high 
wages and job security in core workplaces (Dore 1973; Doeringer and Piore 1971).   
The more encompassing industrial relations institutions in continental European 
countries were thought to make it more difficult to set up core-periphery labour markets.  
Esping-Andersen (1990) observed that Germany experienced a very different post-
industrial employment trajectory in the late 1980s than the US, with sluggish service 
growth compared to the US’s explosion in business-related services and junk jobs.  
Centralized collective bargaining backed up by informal links across works councils 
within and across sectors effectively took wages out of competition. Researchers studying 
the introduction of lean production in the German auto industry in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s found that unions and works councils effectively incorporated the major 
subcontractors into industry agreements and maintained coordinated bargaining across 
these firms (Turner 1991). 
 Several changes since the early to mid-1990s have made outsourcing both more 
attractive to German firms and more disruptive to sectoral bargaining. First, union 
membership and collective bargaining coverage have declined, and therefore German 
trade unions find it more difficult to maintain pressure on employers outside core 
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workplaces.  The flight of small firms from employers’ associations have increased wage 
inequalities between the sectors opened up a gap in regulation that previously existed at a 
much smaller scale (Thelen and Van Wijnbergen 2003). Second, competitive pressures 
have intensified across sectors of the German economy. While export-oriented 
manufacturers faced intensified price competition in the early 1990s, public ownership 
and strong job security agreements in many service industries meant that extensive 
outsourcing remained costly and politically difficult. As telecommunications, banking, 
airlines, and a range of other industries were deregulated in the 1990s, companies faced 
growing price competition and began to look for lower cost alternatives, often in 
partnership with worker representatives, for handling certain “non-core” jobs.   
 This contributed to a third recent trend: the growth of new industry 
segments providing outsourced services – such as IT, call centre, cleaning, and temporary 
agency services.  The boom in outsourcing of support services in Europe lagged about 
five to ten years behind the US (Doellgast 2006; Arzbacher, Holtgrewe, and Kerst 2002). 
As the market and profile of these new niche sectors expanded, more firms started taking 
seriously the option of outsourcing or spinning off work, leading to a boom in business 
process outsourcing. A 2004 report from the consultant group TPI found that Europe 
accounted for close to half of the value of major outsourcing contracts, doubling in value 
over 2002; IT outsourcing led the trend, and business process outsourcing was making 
rapid gains (TPI 2005). Deutsche Bank’s decision in 2003 to shift a large share of its 
European IT operations to IBM was treated in the press as a bellwether case, signalling 
the eroding hold of unions on the investment strategies of their companies (Blau 2003). 
According to the Fraunhofer Institute’s survey of 1630 manufacturing firms, 41 percent 
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of companies surveyed had outsourced production between 1999 to 2001, while only 12 
percent had “insourced” production, or brought it back into the firm (Kinkel and Lay 
2003).  
Temporary agencies have also become a more established sector over the past 
decade, making it easier for firms to outsource staffing to a third party. Regulations 
limiting the length and renewal of temporary postings have been gradually relaxed since 
the mid-1990s. A 2002 law lifted most restrictions on temporary work but required equal 
pay and equal treatment of temporary workers, with a loophole in the case of a collective 
agreement. Two major employers associations formed to negotiate on behalf of 
temporary help agencies, and in 2002 agreed with the Confederation of German Trade 
Unions (DGB) on a skill-based pay scale with 13.5 percent lower rates in the east  
(Dribbusch 2003). This agreement gives temporary agencies a guideline for pay that 
deviates from collectively agreed minimums in the firms that contract with them. 
Although benchmarking, spreading risk, obtaining technology, cutting overhead, 
and dealing with demand swings are important reasons for outsourcing and using 
temporary agency workers, evidence suggests these strategies are also used to avoid high 
wages and additional costs associated with collective agreements. Two separate surveys 
have found that German managers cite cost reductions as the top reason for outsourcing 
(Hendrix, Abendroth, and Wachtler 2003; Kinkel and Lay 2003). Hendrix et al. (2003: 
44, 118, 140) find (in an exclusively West German sample) that firms that outsource 
work are usually successful in winning savings, and that contractors are less likely than 
other firms to be covered by collective bargaining and more likely use contingent 
workers.  
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Vertical disintegration in two sectors  
Available evidence shows that German firms are continuing to shift work to 
subcontractors and subsidiaries, and in some cases have used these strategies to 
undermine sectoral bargaining. There has been less systematic comparative research on 
how outsourcing affects industrial relations in different sectors, and how unions are 
responding.  In this section, we present findings from two sectoral case studies: a 
privatized infrastructure industry (ver.di and IG Metall-represented call centres in 
telecommunications) and an export-oriented private industry (IG Metall-represented auto 
plants). Our findings are based on over 150 interviews between 2003 and 2004 with 
managers, employees, works councillors, trade unionists and policy-makers. We chose 
two sectors that have been treated as key cases of strong social partnership in past 
research on German industrial relations (e.g. Turner 1991; Katz and Darbishire 2000; 
Thelen 1991), and that are diverse along several dimensions, including the union 
involved, level of exposure to international competition, and work characteristics.  
Within each sector, we chose the largest employers, including the former 
telecommunications monopolist and three of its major competitors in the fixed wireline 
and wireless markets, and three of the five largest automakers. Taken together, these case 
study firms represent over 450,000 employees in sectors employing close to one million 
employees. In addition, we conducted interviews and site visits in both West and East 
Germany, to avoid possible biases in our analysis due to differences in union strength and 
coverage across the two regions.  
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Telecommunications2  
The telecommunications industry in Germany changed rapidly after the Deutsche 
Bundespost was privatized and deregulated in the mid to late 1990s, moving from a 
publicly-owned monopoly with one strong union (the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG)) 
to a highly competitive information services sector with multiple unions. Because the 
DPG negotiated the wages and working conditions for all of Deutsche Telekom’s (DT) 
employees in a single-firm agreement, no industry association existed to incorporate new 
market entrants. These firms have been reluctant to cooperate with the former monopolist 
or jeopardize their cost advantage through new collective agreements. In addition, the 
DPG negotiated separate agreements with DT’s core wireline business (T-Com) and its 
newer subsidiaries, such as the wireless subsidiary T-Mobile, leading to growing 
variation in pay and working conditions within the company (Sako and Jackson 2006).  
Unsuccessful negotiations with the internet subsidiary T-Online continued through the 
DPG’s merger with the conglomerate service union ver.di, but were cut short when T-
Online was brought back into DT’s core business in 2005.  
Today DT’s major competitor in the wireline and internet services segments is 
Arcor, which was formed through the merger of o.tel.o, covered by an agreement with the 
chemical union IG Chemie and public sector union ötv, and Mannesmann Arcor AG & 
Co., a joint venture of Mannesmann (under IG Metall’s jurisdiction) and the Deutsche 
Bahn (represented by Transnet). The British-owned firm Vodafone is T-Mobile’s largest 
                                                 
2
 This section summarizes research presented elsewhere (Doellgast 2006: chapters 2 and 3). 
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competitor in the wireless segment, and negotiated a single-firm agreement with IG 
Metall after its hostile take-over of Mannesmann in 2000. Many of the smaller regional 
service providers and foreign-owned MNCs who more recently entered the German 
market have avoided unions altogether. E-Plus, a Dutch-owned company that is currently 
the third largest wireless network provider in Germany, has a central works council but 
still no union agreement. Today trade unions vying for influence in the 
telecommunications industry face substantial challenges from fragmented collective 
agreements, union rivalry, and a growing non-union sector.3 
 
Changing employer strategies.  Deutsche Telekom, Arcor, Vodafone, and E-Plus 
have all responded to growing cost pressures in the telecommunications market by 
subcontracting lower skilled construction, installation and service work. Call centre 
services have been a major target, due to technological advances in the mid-1990s that 
lowered the costs of networking remote sites and contributed to a boom in call centre 
vendors. Several firms turned over all or most of their call centre operations to these 
vendors, which then took over the management of the existing workforce. In 2002, T-
Online sold three locations to different vendors and the mobile phone company E-plus 
sold all three of its call centre locations to the Dutch vendor SNT, affecting close to 2,000 
workers. T-Online kept only 10 percent of call volume in-house to benchmark vendor 
performance.   
                                                 
3
 Although there are no recent estimates of union density in telecommunications, works councilors and 
unionists interviewed estimated between 20-30 percent membership density and 70 percent coverage by 
union-negotiated collective agreements – not including subcontractors.  However, these are all firm-level 
agreements by different unions, and many do not include pay. 
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The other case study firms have all outsourced some portion of their call centre 
work to increase flexibility in responding to daily and seasonal peaks in call volume or to 
cut labour costs for less complex jobs, like outbound sales or directory assistance. T-Com 
sent 2,800 of its 3,500 directory assistance jobs to a vendor, reshuffling those employees 
to its customer service centres and expanding subsidiaries; while T-Mobile gradually 
increased its use of vendors for outbound campaigns, late nights, and weekends. 
Vodafone began outsourcing all call peaks and new calls (around four percent a year) as 
growth in the wireless market fell off and competition increased in the early 2000s. This 
did not lead to job cuts, but meant no new expansion of the in-house workforce. After 
Arcor merged with o.tel.o, the new company set up a separate subsidiary for its call 
centre operations. The new company immediately outsourced all directory assistance 
jobs, and continued to contract with o.tel.o’s vendors for peaks, late nights, weekends, 
and outbound campaigns. Works councillors estimated around 200 jobs were outsourced, 
or 30 percent of call volume. 
 
Union and works council responses.  Labour representatives had varying 
influence over outsourcing decisions at the six firms discussed above, due to differences 
in the strength and coordination of works councils and trade unions. Management at T-
Online and E-Plus faced only minimal resistance due to divided works councils and a 
weak union presence. Works councillors at the locations that had been sold off to vendors 
spoke of feeling “abandoned” by the central works councils, who appeared to be more 
concerned with maintaining the competitiveness of their companies and the higher skilled 
jobs of the larger technical and professional workforce. After two years, these agents 
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were no longer protected under their former employment contracts, and were forced to 
accept cuts in pay, breaks, and vacation time as their new employers tried to stay afloat in 
the extremely price-competitive vendor industry. 
At Vodafone, Arcor, T-Mobile, and T-Com, outsourcing initially served as an 
escape valve that allowed unions and works councils to avoid making politically difficult 
compromises as management stepped up demands for wage concessions, “unsocial” 
working hours (late nights and weekends), and individual-based performance monitoring.  
Although co-determination rights do not extend to these kinds of restructuring decisions, 
management consulted with labour representatives in firms with stronger, more 
coordinated works councils to avoid potential conflict. The DPG and T-Com’s works 
councils decided in the late 1990s to allow management to outsource simple directory 
assistance work rather than accept a lower pay scale. Similarly, at Vodafone, works 
councils allowed management to outsource seasonal peaks in call volume in exchange for 
strong job security protections. In both cases, outsourcing was presented as an alternative 
to other concessions that would directly affect the pay and working conditions of the core 
workforce. 
 These strategies temporarily shifted problems of low pay, speedups, and job 
insecurity onto the vendors’ employees. However, in the long-term they created new 
pressures for concessions. Labour costs at vendors are up to 40 percent less than those at 
telecommunications call centres, monitoring rules are more relaxed, and employees are 
more likely to be employed under short-term contracts. As firms began to benchmark the 
performance of vendors with their internal workforce, they stepped up demands for new 
collective agreements that would bring costs in line with vendors.  
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Unions responded with organizing and campaign strategies that attempted to 
establish representation in new workplaces. When the industry was deregulated in 1998, 
the DPG formed the project Telekommunikation, Informationstechnologie, Medien 
(T.I.M) to organize new firms and industry sectors. These efforts succeeded in getting 
works councils elected at most large call centre vendors, and provided them with advising 
and legal services that resulted in improved work conditions. Many employers were not 
providing the legally mandated Bildschirmspause, an hourly break from the computer 
screen. By mobilizing around this health and safety issue, with the DPG’s support, works 
councillors were able to increase break times for employees in several workplaces, 
reducing stress and improving the overall work climate. The union also organized to win 
equal pay for part-time workers under the terms of a widely disregarded EU directive, 
which helped the DPG increase union membership in some new firms, including E-plus. 
Building on these efforts, ver.di negotiated a collective agreement with the largest third 
party call centre, Walter Telemedien, which was handling Telekom’s directory assistance.  
Despite these successes, however, most call centre vendors continue to have weak 
or no collective agreements and union representation is fragmented across both the 
telecommunications and vendor industries. US-owned vendors have been particularly 
aggressive in closing call centres with activist works councils and moving work to 
locations where they are more “employer friendly.” Regional efforts to build cooperation 
across unions, works councils, and local governments have fizzled out due to lack of 
interest and resources.  
In this environment, labour representatives are turning to strategies that rely on 
residual power and influence, leveraging bargaining strength in core firms to extend 
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representation, bring work back in-house, and avoid further loss of work. In return for 
negotiated assurances against establishment closures, or Standortsicherungs-
vereinbarungen, unions and works councils are willing to grant concessions that reduce 
the cost and flexibility differences between in-house and third-party workers. After T-
Mobile outsourced and closed some locations in the late 1990s, the DPG negotiated an 
agreement that limited layoffs while agreeing to a more “flexible” work time model and a 
lower pay raise. In T-Com, ver.di has used strong job security protections and wage 
concessions to bring outsourced call centre work back into the corporation. In 2004, 
ver.di and DT worked out an agreement to create a new subsidiary called Vivento 
Customer Services (VCS) that now handles simple call centre services, employing 
workers who had been made redundant by earlier rounds of layoffs at 90.5 percent of 
their regular pay. Unionists viewed this as a coup that would allow management to “in-
source” work that had earlier been subcontracted out across the subsidiaries and to 
compete head to head with non-union vendors. However, management recently 
announced further job cuts across DT, including plans to close 45 call centres and 
increase outsourcing. 
In sum, worker representatives have experimented with new strategies to 
influence outsourcing decisions, organize new firms, and establish coordinated regulation 
across telecommunications and call centre vendors. However, these efforts are still 
piecemeal. Unions and works councils have had some success in halting or reversing 
outsourcing in firms where they have an institutional mooring, but at the expense of 
concessions. Outside of Deutsche Telekom, in-firm agreements occur in consultation 
with weaker and more easily intimidated works councils with low union density. Neither 
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new organizing approaches nor strategies to leverage residual power fully address 
growing worker-to-worker competition, and may even exacerbate it.  
 
Automobile Manufacturing 
The German auto industry has long served as the exemplary case of high-quality 
production, cooperative industrial relations and worker participation (Turner 1991; Katz 
and Darbishire 2000; Streeck 1992). Until reunification and the opening of Germany’s 
eastern borders, worker participation rights at Volkswagen, Daimler-Benz, Opel, BMW, 
and Ford were the envy of the world. The growth of low-cost competition and rising 
unemployment have allowed employers to gradually roll these rights back (Springer 
1999). As domestic markets became saturated and both mass and luxury markets grew 
increasingly price-competitive in the 1990s, auto manufacturers pursued new strategies to 
cut costs and increase productivity. One such strategy was to create internal markets that 
forced plants to bid on new investment. German firms have, as a whole, done well in this 
competition: the number of cars produced has increased from 4 million to 5.2 million 
since the 1993-94 industry crisis, bringing the number of employees up from 657,000 to 
773,000. While this growth has come at the cost of concession bargaining, the overall 
employment and production figures in Germany are quite robust.   
IG Metall remains the major union in the auto industry, and, unlike 
telecommunications, all large employers are members of the industry association 
Gesamtmetall and thus signatories to the sectoral agreement for the metal and electrical 
industry. However, the coverage of this agreement has been shrinking as smaller firms 
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leave Gesamtmetall.  In 2001, 62 percent of employees in West Germany and 28 percent 
in East Germany were working in member companies, a decline since 1991 from 68 and 
54 percent respectively (Schroeder and Wessels 2003: 671).  
 
Changing employer strategies. We focus here on three of the largest Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in Germany: Volkswagen, Daimler-Benz, and Ford.  
All three have differentiated pay and working conditions through three strategies: setting 
up new subsidiaries, outsourcing manufacturing and services activities and using 
temporary agencies.4 Subsidiary strategies have taken several forms. VW established a 
new subsidiary in East Germany, VW-Sachsen, which performed a highly lean form of 
auto assembly and engine production that made heavy use of suppliers and agency temps. 
Regular workers were paid at East German wages, which were lower than the “house 
agreement” in the West, and temporary workers and local suppliers allowed further cuts 
in labour costs. A second strategy is to spin off parts production to a separate company. 
Daimler recently opened an engine plant and VW set up a fuel injection plant in East 
Germany, both of which were greenfield locations jointly owned by another company.  
Ford pursued a similar strategy, but converted existing parts plants in West Germany and 
West Berlin into the new company Visteon. Lastly, companies set up subsidiaries to 
compete with suppliers, often with little production in Germany and not under the 
                                                 
4
 Since the concessionary agreements of 2004-5, most of the OEMs also differentiate wages according to 
seniority.  That is, workers hired after a certain point come in under in-plant agreements that have 
eliminated or reduced payments over the level of the sectoral agreement.  Unlike outsourcing, this falls in 
the category of firm-level pacts, which are coordinated by the standard collective bargaining channels. 
 Vertical Disintegration in Germany Page 19 
 
sectoral agreement. VW has done this with wire harnessing (VW Borgnitzer) and 
logistics (Schnellecke).  
 Outsourcing has also taken different forms. First, all three firms outsource parts 
production to third-party suppliers. Some suppliers have stable employment and 
conditions comparable to the OEMs, such as the large “lead factories” of mega-suppliers 
like Bosch that combine development and production functions. Much of the new work, 
however, occurs adjacent to assembly plants in small, dedicated plants, linked to, and 
dependent on, changing production volumes. Auto assembly plants like Ford-Cologne 
and Mercedes-Rastatt put these producers in industrial parks (Juergens 2001); most other 
plants have such dedicated plants linked to them on a just-in-time basis. While nearly all 
auto assembly plants are covered by sectoral agreements or better, suppliers are covered 
by a patchwork of sectoral, firm-level and plant-level agreements. 
 A second strategy is to outsource indirect work within the factories, usually to 
MNCs like Sodexho, Hoermann or TNT that specialize in such functions as forklift 
driving, tooling, maintenance, cafeteria and cleaning services. The three case study firms 
have different strategies in this area. Ford does not outsource any support services in its 
assembly plants, but its subsidiary Visteon outsources all services. DaimlerChrysler and 
VW differ by plant: for example, VW-Sachsen has outsourced all support services, 
representing around a fifth of on-site jobs, while other VW plants range from no to partial 
outsourcing. 
Third, OEMs increasingly contract work out to temporary agencies, including 
firms like Manpower or VW’s Autovision project. These agencies supply both skilled 
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and semi-skilled workers, who work alongside the permanent workforce. VW’s Chemnitz 
engine plant and Visteon’s Berlin plant, with core workforces of 5-600 workers, each 
have more than 100 agency temps. Assembly plants employ much smaller proportions of 
agency temps; VW’s Zwickau assembly plant employs as many as 450 agency temps out 
of a workforce of 6,000. At VW’s Dresden assembly plant and the DaimlerChrysler-
Mitsubishi joint venture near Erfurt, only half of the workers on-site work for the “core” 
firms; the rest work for temporary agencies or service providers. 
 Because of these strategies, the percent of value-added declined at all of the major 
automakers during the 1990s. According to IG Metall’s analysis of corporate financial 
statements, every automaker except for Porsche reduced its percent of value added 
between 1989 to 1998, and the overall “production depth” declined from 41 percent to 35 
percent (Caprile 2000). Managers and union representatives report that over the past 
decade, corporate spinoffs, assembly plant re-tooling and new joint ventures have shifted 
additional work out of the assembly sector.   
 
Union and works council responses. Worker representatives in the auto industry 
have accepted that these moves were necessary to keep the OEMs competitive and to 
keep jobs in Germany. Hard-pressed works councillors (with the support of IG Metall) 
have accepted greater competition and internal segmentation, and – with a few exceptions 
– have not sought to bring work back in-house as in telecommunications. At the same 
time, the increased variation in wages and working conditions across subsidiaries, 
suppliers, service providers, and temp agency workers have increased pressure for 
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concessions and made the in-house workforce more wary of new strategies to shift 
production outside of the “core.”    
 IG Metall and works councillors in the OEMs face growing pressure to adopt new 
strategies aimed at “re-regulating” new work, and have responded in several ways.  First, 
they have adopted campaign approaches to organize new subsidiaries and subcontractors 
and incorporate them into collective agreements. However, because workers lack formal 
co-determination rights on corporate restructuring decisions, unions typically are forced 
to wait until the new plant is open to begin a campaign and then must work from the 
ground up with weak institutional supports. Local IG Metall offices and OEM works 
councils play important roles in establishing new works councils and bargaining with 
management in spun-off plants. At Visteon, the head of the Ford works council 
successfully established transnational worker representation in the new company. When 
Ford’s supplier park opened in Cologne, representatives from the local IG Metall 
recruited union activists to take new jobs and set up works councils and in some firms 
won house agreements. At Mercedes’ supplier park in Rastatt, the core works council not 
only helped establish new works councils and apply collective agreements, but also kept 
them informed about swings in production. In Stuttgart – the core of DaimlerChrysler’s 
production network – the local IG Metall has set up periodic meetings of auto suppliers to 
keep them up to date on the situation at the OEM. The level of coordination depends on 
communication between different works councils across the supplier chain, and thus 
varies substantially from case to case based on local personalities and interest.   
Works councillors and union representatives have also used residual power and 
influence from their existing relationships with the OEMs to cope with vertical 
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disintegration. These strategies were adopted more or less simultaneous with new 
organizing efforts, as international competition created early pressures to reduce labour 
costs. In agreements to allow outsourcing (usually part of a large package of wage and 
working time concessions), works councils often win job security guarantees, investment 
guarantees, early retirement and some assistance finding new work. While the VW and 
Visteon works councils have largely accepted the outsourcing of in-plant work, the 
DaimlerChrysler works council has negotiated alternative forms of cost-cutting. Works 
councillors made especially deep concessions for workers in support services, in lieu of 
outsourcing, and cooperated with a program that allowed management to shift young 
workers from plant to plant in lieu of the use of agency temps.  
One major use of existing relations with OEMs has been through international 
work, spreading standards – or concessions – across the firm’s production chain. 
International solidarity work at DaimlerChrysler, for example, has included framework 
agreements with strong enforcement mechanisms to rectify abuses of core labour rights 
within the companies’ global supplier chains. Unions and works councils have negotiated 
Europe-wide collective agreements to protect workers in spun-off supplier companies. At 
Visteon, IG Metall signed an agreement in 2003 covering plants in Germany, France and 
the UK, which detailed a series of painful measures that increased outsourcing and the 
use of temporary employees while reducing employment substantially. In return, 
companies often make detailed changes in each plant’s product palette and provide 
investment guarantees.  
Despite these efforts, subsidiary and outsourcing strategies have moved a growing 
number of workers to new sectoral agreements with lower wages and in some cases 
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barely existing employers’ associations.5 In-plant forklift operators increasingly abide by 
ver.di’s “logistics” agreement, janitors according to IG BAU’s “building cleaning” 
agreement, and agency temps according to the DGB’s agreement for agency temps. With 
the agreement of IG Metall, VW Sachsen quit the Sachsen employers association over a 
disagreement over bargaining policy. Although the employer joined the sister association 
in Brandenburg, this move deprived IG Metall of its strongest strike target in the state. 
The shift of jobs from the metal sector to firms with weaker collective bargaining 
institutions creates major challenges for local IG Metall officials and works councillors.  
The emergence of supplier parks creates a conflict of interest between OEM works 
councillors, who often want those jobs for their own constituents, and works councillors 
in the suppliers, with an interest in job retention. At Visteon, the firm’s inability to win 
work outside of Ford is forcing layoffs and concessions, and the possibility of the OEM 
subsidizing its former supplier is declining with every year. When OEMs shift suppliers, 
there is often little the works council or IG Metall can do to prevent find new jobs for the 
employees of the losing contractor. The situation is somewhat more favourable for 
workers in in-plant services, since laws governing transfers of undertakings force 
employers to either retain the incumbent workforce or buy workers out. 
The cost-cutting strategy underpinning concessionary agreements at the OEMs 
institutionalizes worker acceptance for these measures, while making it more difficult to 
organize a more “peripheral” workforce. IG Metall has taken on the task of organizing 
new establishments, international colleagues and employee groups. Nonetheless, these 
                                                 
5
 For example, the Saxon transport employers association contains not only operators of logistics firms and 
coach operators, but also hundreds of independent taxi drivers.  There has not been a bargaining round 
since the mid-1990s, which has led to a wage freeze at six euros an hour. 
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efforts have not prevented growing diversity in working conditions and the erosion of 
coordination between works councils, especially across the OEM-supplier divide. 
 
Discussion  
Vertical disintegration contributed to changes in industrial relations and working 
conditions in two sectors with different levels of union density, international exposure, 
labour intensity and history of public ownership. Workers at Deutsche Telekom’s new 
subsidiaries, subcontractors, and competitors lack a sectoral agreement even as a 
reference point. Trade unionists in OEMs are hard-pressed to justify the cost of metal-
industry wages for in-plant support services. The reassignment of work to an 
establishment with a different collective agreement (or no agreement) has led to a mix of 
firm, sectoral and occupational bargaining in each industry, where union strength is 
increasingly contingent on local power relations and actor strategies. 
 In the telecommunications and auto sectors, we have shown the effects of vertical 
disintegration on bargaining structures and wages and working conditions across several 
companies. Their strategies to segment work differ due to variation in union and works 
council bargaining power, as well as strategic choices by labour and management. 
However, all of the companies we examined have successfully cut costs and by-passed 
sectoral agreements for large groups of workers across their production chain through 
outsourcing work, spinning off subsidiaries, or contracting with temporary agencies. 
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Lash and Urry (1987) argued over a decade ago that formerly organized or 
coordinated industrial relations institutions would become increasingly disorganised as 
social and economic organization grew more complex. The case of Germany long 
seemed to provide counter evidence of institutional resilience and path dependence. 
However, today it is widely recognized that the dual system as described by Streeck 
(1984), Thelen (1991) and Turner (1991) is turning into something very different, as a 
non-union sector expands (Hassel 1999), bargaining is decentralized to the firm and 
business-unit level (Katz & Darbishire 2000), and firm-level pacts are “layered” on top of 
existing industrial relations arrangements (Rehder 2003; Streeck & Thelen 2005). While 
these scholars have focused on the growing divide between a shrinking organized core 
and a disorganized periphery, we have shown that the two are closely linked.  Vertical 
disintegration leads to the renegotiation of working conditions in both segments, because 
it breaks apart solidaristic bargaining across a formerly integrated production chain. 
These changes weaken coordinated bargaining and strong forms of industrial citizenship 
that traditionally distinguished European countries from the more liberal Anglo-Saxon 
countries.  
 Thelen has written the most coherent critiques of the disorganisation thesis, based 
on evidence that Germany’s large employers continue to have an interest in maintaining 
centralized bargaining (Thelen and Kume 1999; Thelen and Van Wijnbergen 2003). She 
shows, first, that the 1995 Bavarian metalworkers strike exposed a conflict of interest 
between large firms, who wanted to retain the predictability of the system and smaller, 
firms who preferred militancy and cost-savings. In the end, the larger employers 
prevailed within the employers association and the strike was settled mostly on the 
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union’s terms.  Second, despite neoliberal rhetoric from some quarters, most employers’ 
associations remain committed to collective bargaining. Third, many managers in 
individual firms fear that dismantling the system would lead to more conflict with works 
councils and could lead to an expansion of union influence and works council rights. 
Lastly, shifts of jobs and capital to lower wage countries to the east continue to be 
modest.   
  We have shown that this picture is incomplete without attention to the 
segmentation strategies large firms are pursuing across their production chains. German 
employers have used outsourcing to move work out of sectoral agreements while 
maintaining a formal commitment to sectoral bargaining. Vertical disintegration does not 
require a union-busting motive, since it is – to managers and core firm worker 
representatives – merely a by-product of the search for flexibility and low costs. It does 
not require militant management, tough business associations, or even flight from 
collective bargaining (at least where lower-paying agreements exist). Large private firms 
like VW and Deutsche Telekom are able to remain publicly sympathetic to the need for 
codetermination and collective bargaining. As they shift work out of the core, they are 
not necessarily shifting capital and jobs out of Germany: most of the subcontractors 
discussed above employ a substantial domestic workforce. 
These corporate strategies are more disruptive than other more commonly 
researched forms of restructuring, such as reforms to sectoral agreements, strikes, 
national industrial relations policy and firm-level pacts, because they move jobs to firms 
with weaker firm-level or no collective agreements or to firms belonging to a different 
sector. In both cases, coordinated bargaining across the production chain becomes next to 
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impossible. German codetermination laws provide few formal tools for workers to shape 
this reorganisation, since they do not require consultation with worker representations 
over the terms of outsourcing or the establishment of joint ventures or subsidiaries. 
Organised labour’s search for alternatives consists largely of compensating for the lack of 
influence provided by formal labour laws and bargaining structures. 
Further research is needed to examine whether the findings from this study are 
generalisable to other sectors and countries. First, additional analysis of labour market 
data in Germany would provide a more complete picture of how wages, working 
conditions, and collective bargaining coverage are affected by vertical disintegration. It is 
likely that industries and firms differ in the ease with which managers have been able to 
outsource work, the extent of cost savings, and associated workers outcomes. While we 
have emphasized the similarities between vertical disintegration in autos and 
telecommunications, there are also clear differences in the resilience of sectoral 
bargaining institutions and union and works council strategies. More systematic analysis 
of these differences may help to identify the conditions under which unions may be more 
or less successful in influencing outsourcing decisions. 
Second, further comparative research is needed to examine the role of national 
institutions in shaping outsourcing strategies and their effects. Differences in labour law, 
collective bargaining structures, and trade union strategies across “social Europe” are 
likely to influence the ease with which employers are able to segment work across firms, 
and the incentives to do so. For example, in Scandinavian countries the right to secondary 
boycotts has given unions more leverage to pressure employers to remain under sectoral 
agreements. A comparative study of MNCs in the Dutch and German 
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telecommunications industry found that the same companies used temporary agencies in 
the Netherlands and subcontractors in Germany to improve staffing flexibility (DeGrip et 
al. 2005). These strategies had similar motivations but different outcomes for workers, 
due to strong negotiated protections for temporary agency workers in the Netherlands.  
Vertical disintegration is becoming an increasingly important strategic issue for 
unions world-wide, but relatively little is known about the effects on collective 
bargaining. This paper has shown that German trade unions are having difficulty 
adjusting to more decentralised production networks and are often weakened by 
outsourcing strategies as it becomes more difficult to regulate wages and working 
conditions across the production chain. Germany’s seemingly strong, flexible, and 
encompassing industrial relations institutions have as yet provided few mechanisms for 
bridging the segments of the labour market hardened by corporate restructuring. 
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